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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the usability of human-like agent-based 
interfaces. In an experiment we manipulate the capabili-
ties and the “human-likeness” of a travel advisory agent. 
We show that users of the more human-like agent form an 
anthropomorphic use image of the system: they act as if 
the system is human, and try to exploit typical human-like 
capabilities. Unfortunately, this severely reduces the usa-
bility of the agent that looks human but lacks human-like 
capabilities (overestimation effect). We also show that the 
use image users form of agent-based systems is inherently 
integrated (as opposed to the compositional use image 
they form of conventional GUIs): cues provided by the 
system do not instill user responses in a one-to-one 
manner, but are instead integrated into a single use image. 
Consequently, users try to exploit capabilities that were 
not signaled by the system to begin with, thereby further 
exacerbating the overestimation effect. 
Keywords 
Agent-based interaction, anthropomorphism, usability, 
feedforward and feedback, use image. 
INTRODUCTION 
Agent-based interaction, in which the user interacts with a 
virtual entity using natural language, has been a topic of 
HCI research for several decades (Qui and Benbasat 
2009; Walker et al. 1994; Quintanar et al. 1987; Nicker-
son 1976), and has gained renewed attention with the rise 
of smartphone agents like Siri, Cortana and Google Now. 
Because agent-based interaction is finer grained and 
richer than interaction with conventional Graphical User 
Interfaces (GUIs), it should better suit the increasingly 
complex tasks we perform with computers (Laurel 1990). 
People also find agent-based interaction more enjoyable 
and more natural (Kang et al. 2012; Hess et al. 2005). At 
the same time, though, some agents remind us of 
“Clippy”: they seem unable to live up to their promises 
(Nowak 2006; Dehn and van Mulken 2000). In this paper 
we address the usability of agent-based interaction, and 
identify a cognitive principle that makes agent-based 
interaction different from traditional GUIs. 
RELATED WORK AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
To explain why some systems are more usable than 
others, Norman (1986) argues that there are two gulfs 
between the user and the system: the gulf of execution 
(the user has to discover how to manipulate the system to 
accomplish a task) and the gulf of evaluation (the user has 
to interpret whether output of the system is in line with 
their goal). Users bridge these gulfs by forming a “use 
image”, a mental representation of the way the system 
works that helps them to infer which interface actions 
fulfill their goal, and what the output of the system means. 
According to Norman, the formation of an adequate use 
image is greatly facilitated by providing appropriate 
feedback (e.g. responses to actions) and feedforward (e.g. 
labels on buttons). 
The Layered Protocol Theory (LPT) operationalizes 
Norman’s use image theory (Taylor 1988). It decomposes 
user-system interaction into a set of layers, each breaking 
users’ intentions down into smaller components. 
Brinkman (2003) argues that this compositional character 
is reflected in the users’ use image: the compositional use 
image is the sum of the use images of its widgets (e.g. 
levers, buttons, text fields, scrollbars). 
Agent-Based Use Images 
Many usability researchers and designers have assumed 
the compositionality of the use image. Most usability 
evaluation techniques evaluate the different parts of an 
interface separately; the effectiveness of these techniques 
thus depends on the legitimacy of the compositional use 
image. Compositionality seems to hold for “real life” 
interfaces (e.g., doors, phones) as well as conventional 
GUIs. However, agent-based interfaces typically lack the 
common levers, buttons, text fields and scrollbars. So 
how do users form a use image of agent-based interfaces?  
Cook and Salvendy (1989) note that users infer the use 
image of an agent-based system from the way it “looks” 
and “talks” (feedforward) and the apparent intelligence of 
its responses (feedback), just like they would do when 
interacting with other human beings. In fact, Laurel 
(1990) argues that users attribute common human 
intelligence to systems that provide human-like 
appearance and capability cues. Indeed, studies show that 
users of systems with a cartoon character that “talks” in 
full sentences and personifies itself believe that it shows 
some form of human intelligence, while users do not 
show similar beliefs when using a system without such a 
cartoon character that talks “computerese” (De Laere et 
al. 1998; Quintanar et al. 1987). We thus argue that: 
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The more human-like the system looks (appearance cues) 
and the more capabilities it displays (capability cues), the 
more intelligent users believe the system to be. 
Note that the actual capabilities of the system might not 
necessarily co-occur with capability cues; the system 
might exhibit specific linguistic capabilities (e.g. using 
the word “here” to refer to the current location) without 
actually being able to understand them in the user dialog 
(e.g. it may not be able to infer the current location when 
the user uses the word “here”). In effect, cues of human-
like appearance and capabilities can underplay or over-
play the agent’s actual capabilities. 
What psychological mechanisms could underlie the use 
image of believed intelligence? Thompson (1980) found 
that users of a natural language-based system showed a 
tendency to anthropomorphize the behavior of the system, 
and this tendency also increases with personalization, 
conversational tone, affective responses and diversified 
wording (Quintanar et al. 1987; De Laere et al. 1998). Not 
only agents are subject to anthropomorphism: users of any 
computer system occasionally engage in negative 
anthropomorphism (e.g. shouting; Chin, et al. 2005), and 
adhere to social principles (e.g. politeness effect; Reeves 
and Nass, 1996). Bradshaw (1997) argues that when a 
system’s behavior is too complex to understand, users are 
inclined to take the “intentional stance” (Dennett 1987): 
they attribute intentional behavior to systems as a 
convenient shortcut towards explaining complicated 
behavioral patterns (i.e. the system “wants me to do X”, 
or “doesn’t like it when I do Y”). This then also leads 
them to adhere to human social principles. The intentional 
stance holds for any system, but agents instill stronger 
anthropomorphic reactions (Nowak 2006). Therefore: 
In agent-based systems, the intentional stance is at the 
heart of the use image construction. The use image is an 
anthropomorphic construct, instilled by human-like cues.   
As the use image is a mental construct, one cannot 
observe directly whether or not it is anthropomorphic. 
However, reactions to the use image can provide evidence 
of its nature: if the use image is anthropomorphic, users 
will interact with the agent in a way that is in accordance 
with human-human interaction. Examples of “Human-like 
responses” are the use of long and grammatically correct 
sentences. Indeed existing research has found that the use 
of a human-like avatar and personalized feedback 
(human-like cues that may lead to an anthropomorphic 
use image) leads users to be more verbose in their 
responses (Brennan 1991; Rosé and Torrey 2005; Walker 
et al. 1994; Richards and Underwood 1984). In sum: 
Since the use image of an agent is anthropomorphic, 
users will act in a more human-like way towards a system 
they believe to be more intelligent.  
Moreover, if the system looks and behaves human, then 
users will believe it has typical human capabilities, and 
will try to exploit these capabilities. An important 
category of human capabilities is the linguistic capability 
of implicit reference to the context of the conversation 
(Levinson 1983; Halliday and Hasan 1976). Computers 
are notoriously bad at understanding such references 
(Winograd 1972; Dey 2001; Scheutz et al. 2011), but 
users may believe that human-like systems, like human 
beings, can resolve them. Specifically, they may believe 
that agents can understand references to a mentioned 
location, (e.g. “here”, “there”), time (e.g. “now”, “then”), 
or object (“that trip”, “that ticket”). In sum, we argue that: 
Users will assume that systems they believe to be more 
intelligent have more advanced linguistic capabilities, 
and they will try to exploit these capabilities. 
An Integrated Use Image? 
If agent-based interfaces were like traditional GUIs, their 
use image would be compositional. There would be a one-
to-one mapping where each cue would instill its own use 
image and induce a corresponding response. Brennan 
(1991) found support for such a one-to-one mapping in 
both human-human and natural language-based human-
computer interaction. Participants in her experiments 
showed syntactic entrainment; a direct reflection of the 
conversation partner’s responses. According to these 
findings, one could evoke a certain behavior in the users’ 
response by expressing the same behavior in the agent. 
However, the intentional stance (Dennett 1987) should 
allow users to create an integrated use image based on the 
behavior of the system as a whole. If the system is 
sufficiently human-like, it will be attributed intentional 
behavior, and this attribution is based on the “human-
likeness” of the agent as a whole, not on a specific part of 
its behavior. The fact that the “system” is “human” 
provides them instantaneously and effortlessly with a 
detailed use image of what it can do and how to interact 
with it: if the system looks and behaves human, the use 
image simply dictates that the system can and cannot do 
whatever humans can and cannot do. In the words of 
Laurel (1990, pp. 358-359): “[An agent] makes optimal 
use of our ability to make accurate inferences about how a 
character is likely to think, decide and act on the basis of 
its external traits. This marvelous cognitive shorthand is 
what makes plays and movies work […] With interface 
agents, users can employ the same shorthand—with the 
same likelihood of success—to predict, and therefore 
control the actions of their agents.” However, if users 
integrate the system cues into a single use image of 
believed intelligence, this creates a much less straight-
forward relation between system cues and user responses: 
All cues about the intelligence of the system will be 
integrated into a single use image and instill a series of 
possibly unrelated responses.  
The integrated use image has both positive and negative 
consequences for agents’ usability (Dehn and van Mulken 
2000; Qiu and Benbasat, 2009). The integrated use image 
makes agents especially suitable for complex tasks. 
Conventional GUIs require additional widgets for each 
additional function, which makes it impossible to create a 
Knijnenburg et al.  Inferring Capabilities of Intelligent Agents 
Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Workshop on HCI Research in MIS, Auckland, New Zealand, December 14, 2014 
 3 
really usable GUI for a complex system. Agent-based 
interfaces, on the other hand, have an integrated use 
image that instantly provide users with a heuristic to 
determine what they can and cannot do, and how to 
access the functionality. However, if the agent looks more 
capable than it actually is, users will overestimate the 
system’s capabilities, which will result in confusion and 
reduced usability (Brennan 1991; Forlizzi et al. 2007; 
Walker et al. 1994). 
Good usability arises when the user tries to use only those 
capabilities that the system actually provides. This means 
that the use image has to match the actual system 
capabilities (Norman 1986). If the use image of an agent 
were compositional, it would be fairly easy to “manage” 
this use image: the system could simply provide a 
matching cue for each capability. However, an integrated 
use image is much harder to manage, because there is 
more than just a one-to-one relation between cues and 
responses. In effect, even human-like appearance cues 
may instill capability-exploiting responses: merely 
“looking human” may be enough to make users believe 
that the system has certain human-like capabilities (even 
if these are not actually present). 
In sum, the presumed integrated use image is responsible 
for both the greatest advantage but at the same time the 
most significant drawback of agent-based interaction: due 
to our natural tendency to use anthropomorphism, it is 
very easy to instantly create a complex, integrated use 
image from which users can effortlessly infer a myriad of 
complex functions to perform with the system, along with 
possible ways to exploit them. However, since these 
functions are not directly coupled to a specific underlying 
cue, an overestimation effect can easily occur, and it will 
be rather difficult to tweak this use image such that it 
perfectly matches the actual system capabilities. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The goal of our experiment is to empirically demonstrate 
that the use image of agents is more likely to be integrated 
rather than compositional. We also want to test if an 
agent-based use image indeed instills human-like and 
capability-exploiting responses. Finally, we want to 
evaluate the effect of these responses on the usability of 
the interaction (i.e. the overestimation effect). 
In our experiment, we independently vary the system’s 
feedforward cues and its actual capabilities. There are 
three levels of cues: “computer-like cues” (agent looks 
and talks like a computer), “human-like appearance cues” 
(agent looks and talks like a human being), and “human-
like appearance and capability cues” (agent additionally 
uses references in its sentences, which signals its 
capability to understand such references). There are two 
levels of capabilities: “low capabilities” (system can only 
process simple, complete requests) and “high capabilities” 
(system can process complex requests with implicit 
references, like a human being). We argue that a system 
with high capabilities should generally be easier to use:  
H1. Usability in the “high capabilities” condition should 
be higher than in the “low capabilities” condition. 
Within the low capabilities conditions overestimation can 
occur, when the system appears human-like and displays 
human-like cues: 
H2. Within the “low capabilities” conditions, the “human-
like appearance cues” and “human-like appearance 
and capability cues” conditions should lead to lower 
usability than the “computer-like cues” condition. 
Moreover, the existence of an anthropomorphic use image 
predicts the presence of more human-like and capability-
exploiting responses when human-like cues are provided: 
H3. Within the “high capabilities” conditions, the 
“human-like appearance cues” and the “human-like 
appearance and capability cues” conditions lead to 
more human-like and capability-exploiting responses 
than in the “computer-like cues” condition. 
Finally, if the agent-based use image is compositional, 
appearance cues cannot evoke capability-exploiting 
responses, and users will try to exploit human-like 
capabilities in the “human-like appearance and capability 
cues” condition only. But if the use image is integrated, a 
human-like appearance cue given by the agent can evoke 
capability-exploiting responses, and users will try to 
exploit human-like capabilities in both the “human-like 
appearance cues” and the “human-like appearance and 
capability cues” conditions. In other words, if the 
following hypothesis is upheld, this would rule out the 
compositional use image would predict, and provide 
evidence for an integrated use image: 
H4. Within the “high capabilities” conditions, users 
exhibit more capability-exploiting responses than in 
the “computer-like cues” condition even when the 
system does not give human-like capability cues (i.e. 
even in the “human-like appearance cues” condition). 
Experimental setup 
For the experiment we created an online agent that gives 
travel info for the Dutch Railways. 92 university students 
from all over The Netherlands (35 male; age M=21.8, 
SD=3.55) took part in the experiment. For additional 
power to test H3 and H4, 59 participants were randomly 
assigned to the “high capabilities” conditions and only 33 
to the “low capabilities” conditions. Users performed four 
predefined tasks (e.g. “You are in Eindhoven and you 
want to go to Tilburg. Find out if you have to switch 
trains anywhere.”) by typing requests to the system. A 
Wizard of Oz technique was used to provide the answers: 
users were ostensibly interacting with a real system, but 
were actually talking to the experimenter, who read inputs 
and provided responses using a strict protocol. 
We measured personal references, number words per re-
quest, and grammatical correctness of requests as human-
like responses. These behaviors typically occur in 
interaction between two humans, but not when interacting 
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with a computer (Rosé et al. 2005; Shechtman and 
Horowitz 2003; Brennan, 1991). We measured explicit 
and implicit references to times, places, and earlier 
questions, and asking multiple questions at once, as 
capability-exploiting responses. These behaviors occur 
when a participant assume that the agent understands the 
context of the conversation, like a human would. Finally, 
we measured usability by the number of requests and 
amount of time participants needed per task (efficiency), 
the difference in time per task between the first and last 
task (learnability), the “overall reactions to the software” 
section of the QUIS (Chin et al. 1988), and occurrences of 
users discontinuing the experiment (effectiveness). 
RESULTS 
We first confirm that the system with high capabilities is 
actually more usable than the system with low capabilities 
(H1) Users needed fewer requests per task (2.38 vs. 3.32, 
p < .005), and were more satisfied (31.47 vs. 24.07,  
p < .001) in the high-capabilities than the low-capabilities 
conditions, indicating that the former was indeed more 
usable than the latter. The average time needed to perform 
the tasks was actually higher in the high capabilities 
conditions than the low capabilities conditions (211s vs. 
185s, not significant). 
H2 suggests that for low capability systems, users in the 
“human-like appearance cues” and “human-like appear-
ance and capability cues” conditions overestimate the 
capabilities of the system, resulting in lower usability than 
the “computer-like cues” condition. Strong evidence for 
overestimation was found in terms of system effective-
ness: 5 of the 23 participants interacting with a system 
with low capabilities but human-like cues (and none for 
computer-like cues) prematurely quit the experiment. 
Additional evidence of overestimation was found in terms 
of learnability. Within the low-capabilities condition, 
users of the computer-like interface showed a higher time 
decrease from task 1 to task 4 (–108.56s) than users of the 
human-like systems (–40.12s and –25.89s, p < .05).  
H3 suggests that human-like responses in the “high 
capabilities” conditions increase from computer-like cues, 
to human-like appearance cues, to human-like appearance 
and capability cues. Figure 1 shows that first-person 
references (β = 1.16, p < .001), words per chat request  
(β = 2.50, p < .005) and grammatical correctness  
(β = 6.47, p < .005) indeed increased with cue level. This 
is evidence for the existence of an anthropomorphic use 
image, as several human-like responses were significantly 
higher when the system had more human-like cues. 
H3 also suggests that the occurrence of capability-
exploiting responses in the “high capabilities” conditions 
increases with cue level. A sum measure of the five 
capability-exploiting responses (see Measures) was taken 
for each task. Figure 1 (rightmost panel) shows that the 
number of capability-exploiting responses in the human-
like conditions is significantly higher than in the 
computer-like cues condition (β
 
= 0.288, p < .05). These 
results provide further evidence for the existence of an 
anthropomorphic use image, as the total number of 
capability-exploiting responses was significantly higher 
when the system had more human-like cues. 
Finally, if users have an integrated use image (H4), they 
should show capability-exploiting responses even when 
the system does not give human-like capability cues (i.e. 
when it gives human-like appearance cues only). Figure 1  
(bottom panel) shows that capability-exploiting responses 
are indeed higher in the “human-like appearance cues” 
systems than in the “computer-like cues” condition (a 
planned contrast between “computer-like cues” and the 
other two conditions is significant at p < .05). This rules 
out a compositional use image, since it would require that 
only the capability cues condition can induce capability-
exploiting responses. In fact, capability-exploiting 
responses in the “human-like appearance cues” condition 
are not significantly different from the “human-like 
appearance and capability cues” condition.  
CONCLUSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Siri, Cortana and Google Now show that agents definitely 
have potential. Still, managers have to be very careful 
introducing a human-like agent in their systems. Human-
like agents are a metaphor; its cues are effortlessly inte-
grated into a single use image. This use image, though, 
instills a set of responses that do not necessarily need to 
be directly related to the provided cues. Specifically, 
capability-exploiting responses can be induced even by 
appearance cues alone. If the agent looks “too human”, 
users might overestimate its capabilities, and suffer from 
bad usability. For usable agent-based interaction, each cue 
must thus be delicately tuned to instill the right beliefs.  
    
Figure 1. Pps use more human-like and capability-exploiting responses towards systems with human-like cues (HLC) and human-like and 
capability-exploiting cues (HLCEC), than towards systems with computer-like cues (CLC). 
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Such fine-tuning projects call for artificial intelligence 
specialists that can develop smarter systems, social 
psychologists that know self-presentation techniques, 
designers that can build these techniques into their charac-
ters, and usability researchers that can test the correctness 
of the formed use image with users. Arguably, only such a 
multidisciplinary team can bring about a successful 
paradigm shift from GUIs to agent-based interfaces. 
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